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Abstract—The Android OS has become the most popular
mobile operating system leading to a significant increase in
the spread of Android malware. Consequently, several static
and dynamic analysis systems have been developed to detect
Android malware. With dynamic analysis, efficient test input
generation is needed in order to trigger the potential run-time
malicious behaviours. Most existing dynamic analysis systems
employ random-based input generation methods usually built
using the Android Monkey tool. Random-based input generation
has several shortcomings including limited code coverage, which
motivates us to explore combining it with a state-based method
in order to improve efficiency. Hence, in this paper, we present a
novel hybrid test input generation approach designed to improve
dynamic analysis on real devices. We implemented the hybrid
system by integrating a random based tool (Monkey) with a
state based tool (DroidBot) in order to improve code coverage
and potentially uncover more malicious behaviours. The system
is evaluated using 2,444 Android apps containing 1222 benign
and 1222 malware samples from the Android malware genome
project. Three scenarios, random only, state-based only, and our
proposed hybrid approach were investigated to comparatively
evaluate their performances. Our study shows that the hybrid
approach significantly improved the amount of dynamic features
extracted from both benign and malware samples over the state-
based and commonly used random test input generation method.
Index Terms—Android; Malware; Malware detection; Test
input generation; DroidBot; Monkey; Code coverage; API calls;
Intents
I. INTRODUCTION
Smartphones are becoming an essential electronic device
of everyone’s daily life. With nearly 80% market share, the
Google Android Operating system (OS) is the leading OS
in the market compared to iOS, Windows, Blackberry, and
Symbian mobile. Over 65 billion downloads have been made
from the official Google play store and there are currently
more than 1 billion Android devices worldwide [1]. Statista
[2] reports there will be more than 1.5 billion Android devices
shipped worldwide by 2020. At the same time, malware
targeting Android devices has increased significantly over the
last few years. According to a report from McAfee, there are
around 2.5 million new Android malware samples exposed
every year which increased the total number of malware
samples discovered in the wild to more than 12 million [3].
Android malware can be found in a variety of applications
such as gaming apps, banking apps, social media apps, educa-
tional apps, utility apps etc. Malware-infected apps may have
access to privacy-sensitive information, send text messages to
premium rate numbers without user approval, or even install
a rootkit on the device enabling it to download and execute
any code the malware developer wants to deploy etc.
To mitigate the spread of malware, Google introduced
Bouncer to its Play store in Feb 2012. Bouncer is the system
used to monitor submitted apps for potentially harmful be-
haviours. It uses a sandbox to test the submitted applications
for five minutes in order to spot any malicious activities.
However, Bouncer can be evaded by means of some simple
detection avoidance techniques [4]. Furthermore, most third
party app stores do not have any screening mechanisms for
submitted apps. There is therefore a need for efficient detection
mechanisms to detect zero-day Android malware in the wild.
Several approaches for detecting Android malware have been
proposed in previous works. These approaches are categorized
into either static or dynamic analysis or utilize both.
In the static analysis approach, the code is usually reverse
engineered and examined for presence of any malicious code.
[5], [6], [7], [8], [9] are a few examples of detection solu-
tions based on static analysis. While in the dynamic analysis
method, the application is executed in a controlled environ-
ment, such as a sandbox or virtual machine, or a physical
device with the purpose of tracing its behaviour. Researchers
have proposed several types of automated dynamic analysis
systems to detect suspicious activities and behaviours from
Android apps [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16]. However,
the efficiency of these systems depend on the ability to effec-
tively trigger the malicious behaviours during the analysis.
Android apps are heavily user interface (UI) driven, which
makes automated dynamic analysis on smartphones more
difficult compared to traditional desktop scenarios. Because of
the UI operation, efficient input generation is very important
for testing apps and many tools are available to aid devel-
opers. Likewise, efficient input generation is needed to drive
automated dynamic analysis for malware detection. On the
Android platform, malware can hide their malicious activities
behind events that require user interaction. Therefore, to test
the apps dynamically, researchers need a tool that can simulate
the human input to trigger these apps to start their malicious
behaviours. The main goal is to reach a high percentage
of code coverage such that most of the suspicious activities
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2are revealed during the analysis. Code coverage refers to
the amount of the source code that has been traversed and
executed during the dynamic analysis of the apps. Many of the
existing dynamic analysis systems such as AppsPlayGround
[13], A3E [17], and DynoDroid [18] rely on a random-
based input generation strategy based on the Android Monkey
UI exerciser tool [19]. According to an empirical study
[20], Monkey reached the highest code coverage compared
to other test input generation methods. In particular, the study
showed that Monkey achieved higher code coverage than more
sophisticated test input generation systems like Dynodroid
[18], ACTEve [21], A3E [17], GUIRipper [22], SwiftHand
[23], and PUMA [24]. Due to the randomness of the inputs
generated by Monkey, it may reach certain points in the
phone where it is not intended or desired during the dynamic
analysis. For example, Monkey could generate inputs that may
turn on airplane mode, turn off Wi-Fi, or even turn off the
USB debugging mode (which is necessary for device based
analysis), etc. All of these will affect the performance of the
dynamic analysis tools.
Hence, in order to overcome the aforementioned limitations,
we are motivated to explore combining the advantages of
different types of test input generation methods to increase
the percentage of code coverage as much as possible and
potentially collect more dynamic features (API call logs and
intents). In this study, we implemented a novel strategy by
combining a random-based method (implemented using Mon-
key [19]) with the state-based method (implemented using
DroidBot [25]). Monkey is designed to provide developers
with a random testing tool. Whereas DroidBot is a tool
designed to intelligently understand the app operation by sta-
tistically analysing its code and dynamically analysing the app
User Interface (UI) hierarchy. We have implemented the hybrid
input generation strategy using python and incorporated this
into the DynaLog [16] dynamic analysis tool. Furthermore, in
order to validate this approach, we examine the performance
of the hybrid method by comparative analysis of Monkey
vs. Hybrid, DroidBot vs. Hybrid, Monkey vs. DroidBot, and
Monkey vs. DroidBot vs. Hybrid in order to evaluate the
performance in terms of number of dynamic API logs and
system events collected during analysis. We speculate that
the higher the code coverage the more the number of API
related features we would be able to extract from the apps.
The experiments were performed on real devices using 1222
benign samples from McAfee Labs (Intel Security) and 1222
malware samples from the Android malware genome project
[26].
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
discusses the Android input generation/application triggering
tools. Section III details the methodology and experiments un-
dertaken to evaluate the hybrid approach. Section IV presents
and discusses the results. Section V discusses the related work,
followed by conclusions and future work in Section VI.
Fig. 1. Phone based feature extraction using DynaLog.
II. TRIGGERING ANDROID APPLICATIONS
As mentioned earlier, there are a number of tools available
for dynamic analysis of Android applications. As the main
goal is to analyse and detect zero-day malware, there is a
need to find the most effective way to ensure adequate code
coverage in order to find malicious behaviour with these tools.
Android applications can be dynamically analysed by logging
API function calls and their response to broadcast events and
intents. In order to log these features from the applications
at run-time, a platform is needed where an efficient approach
to increase the code coverage will also be applied. Since our
goal is to perform experiments to compare a random-based,
state-based and a hybrid based method on real devices, we
need to extract the features in all of these scenarios to make
the comparison. Therefore, we applied the DynaLog dynamic
analysis framework described in [16] for all the experiments
in this paper.
DynaLog is designed to automatically process thousands
of applications, starting them sequentially in an emulator or
phone, logging several dynamic features and extracting them
for further processing. The framework offers the ability to
instrument each application with the needed API calls to be
observed, logged and extracted during the dynamic analysis.
APIMonitor tool [27] was used to build the instrumentation
component of DynaLog. It currently relies on the random-
based Monkey tool for test input generation. DynaLog frame-
work was extended to be enable device based dynamic analysis
as described in [28]. From the results of the study in [28], we
utilize this extended version of DynaLog for the experiments
presented in this paper using real phones to mitigate the poten-
tial impact of anti-emulation and environmental limitations of
emulators on our dynamic analysis. Fig. 1 shows an overview
of the dynamic analysis process.
A. Random input generation method
Monkey is a random events generator provided as a part of
the Android developers’ toolkit, which does not require any
modification to run. It is also known as an application exerciser
tool that sends pseudo-random events of clicks, swipes, touch
screens, gestures, etc, to a real device or an emulator. This is
to ensure that most of the activities will be traversed to ensure
that a high percentage of the application code is covered. In
order to start Monkey, the user must to declare the number
of events needed to be generated. Once this upper bound is
reached, Monkey will be terminated. Monkey can be run with
the Android Debug Bridge (adb) tool to test the application
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3Fig. 2. Monkey configuration command using adb shell.
and report any errors that are encountered. The basic command
to use monkey is as follows:
• adb shell monkey <options>
In our experiments, we configure Monkey to run 4000
events for each application and assigned a seed value of 500
for the pseudo-random number generator. The configuration
was set to ignore any security exceptions, crashes, or system
timeout during the analysis (see Fig. 2). Monkey continues to
send events to the application UI until the number of events
chosen is reached or until it encounters an error and ’crashes’.
From our experience, some of the drawbacks of using Monkey
on device based dynamic analysis include:
• The random events generated could lead to turning off the
Wi-Fi connection on the phone during the analysis. The
Wi-Fi would then remain turned off unless by chance
another sequence of random events turns it back on
(which is very rare). This situation may hide malicious
behaviours that require Internet connection before they
can be triggered.
• The random events generated could also turn on the
Airplane Mode thus preventing the device from sending
or receiving calls, text messages and from connecting to
the Internet.
• Monkey could also generate random events that leads
to unintended re-configurations of the device and some
unwanted behaviour that could affect the analysis. For
example, turning off adb debugging from the developer
options on the phone which automatically disconnects the
phone from the USB connection during analysis.
• Monkey can only generate UI events but not system
events [18].
• As it is a random-based input generation tool, Monkey
often generates non-relevant events to the current state.
These redundant events have no consistent pattern and
cannot keep track of events that have already been
covered.
To overcome some of the above listed shortcomings of using
Monkey in our experiments, we check the status of the Wi-
Fi as well as the Airplane mode in order to ensure that they
are kept in the desired mode as much as possible throughout
the analyses. Fig. 3 Illustrates the code for Airplane mode
checking while Fig. 4 shows the code used for checking and
restoring the device’s Wi-Fi connectivity. The Wi-Fi status
is checked prior to starting the analysis of each application
and is enabled if it is currently in the disabled state. This
capability was implemented using dumpsys, within an adb
shell as illustrated in Fig. 4. Two of the keyevents i.e. ’19’
and ’23’ are sent via adb shell to turn on the Wi-Fi if it is
Fig. 3. Python code to check and restore the Airplane mode in the real phone.
switched off. Note that, in some devices the required keyevent
combination could be ’20’ and ’23’ instead of ’19’ and ’20’.
B. State-based input generation method
In this study, we used an open source automated test input
generation tool known as DroidBot [25] in order to implement
a state-based approach. DroidBot is also an Android app
exerciser that is considerably smarter than Monkey and can
utilize static information extracted from the APK file (e.g. list
of sensitive user events) that could be used to improve the
event generation. It can avoid redundant re-entry of explored
UI states by dynamic UI analysis. Also, DroidBot does not
send random gestures (touch, click etc.) like monkey but
sends specific gestures according to the position and type of
the UI element (unless a ’random’ event generation policy is
selected). Because of this capability we refer to DroidBot as
a ’state-based’ generation tool. DroidBot follows four distinct
steps when testing an app:
• Connect to a device i.e. emulator or real device.
• Statically analyse the apk using Androguard to infer the
list of broadcasts the app may handle and the list of
permission the app requires.
• Set up the environment with device usage data like
SMS logs, call logs, etc. This is set up according to
’environment policies’.
• Send user events. The events include gestures, broadcasts,
key presses, etc., just like the events generated when a
user uses the device. Same as setting up environments,
DroidBot has multiple policy choices for sending events.
For example, static policy is to send app-specific events
according to static analysis, and dynamic policy is an
extension of the static policy which improves UI event
efficiency by dynamically monitoring the UI states. Since
we are interested in using DroidBot as a state-based input
generator, we chose the ’dynamic’ policy configuration
during our experiments.
DroidBot also suffers from some limitations. The dynamic
policy mode is quite slow as the event state needs to be
inferred. Monkey can generate events at a far more rapid pace
with the random approach. Even though DroidBot is smarter
than Monkey, it is still far less intelligent than manual testing.
DroidBot is also unable to deal with unexpected situations,
and can get confused by login screens or gets stuck at popup
windows and drop-down menus. Since it is not feasible to
incorporate manual testing in our automated dynamic analysis
of thousands of applications, DroidBot’s dynamic approach
is perhaps the closest we can get to manual interaction. Since
both random-based and the state-based methods have strengths
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combining their strengths in a hybrid test input generation
approach.
C. Hybrid input test method
In this subsection, we discuss our implementation of the
hybrid test input generation strategy within the extended
DynaLog dynamic analysis framework. As mentioned earlier,
DynaLog already relies on Monkey, thus, we need to find
a way to integrate DroidBot into the platform. We did this
by incorporating a call to invoke a DroidBot instance after
Monkey finishes sending its events. Because DroidBot closes
the connection with the adb after it finishes, it would not
be ideal to start DroidBot before running Monkey. After a
number of preliminary tests, we found that Monkey turns on
the Airplane modes quite frequently on the devices. This is
because the menu was quite easy to reach after a few touches
and presses. We also found that the WiFi connection was
sometimes turned off as well. Even though we implemented a
check for the Airplane mode status at the beginning of each
analysis, it will not turn on the Wi-Fi if has been turned off.
Therefore, at the start of each analysis, the Wi-Fi status will
be checked as well to make sure it is enabled. These processes
will be repeated before and after the running Monkey in order
to ensure that the right configuration settings are enabled
before DroidBot is started. The process of checking and re-
setting the device configurations during the analysis with the
hybrid test input generation is illustrated in Fig. 5.
III. METHODOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTS
A. Testbed Setup
The experiments to evaluate the impact of the hybrid test
input generation on the dynamic analysis of Android apps were
performed using real phones with the following configurations.
The phones were: an Elephone P9000 brand equipped with
Android 6.0 Marshmallow, Helio P10 MTK6755 Octa Core
CPU, 4GB RAM, 4G LTE, 32 GB of ROM, and 32 GB of
external SD card storage. Moreover, each phone was installed
with a sim card that has some credit to enable sending SMS,
outgoing calls, and 3G data usage. The phones also were
connected to an internal Wi-Fi access point with internet
connection to allow the analysed apps to communicate with
their external servers if needed. The analysis was performed in
Fig. 4. Python code to check the Wi-Fi status and restore with the connection
in the real phone.
Fig. 5. Checking and restoring device configurations on the hybrid input
generation system.
three scenarios. First, all the apps were processed and analysed
using Monkey only. Then, they were run again in the analysis
environment using DroidBot. Lastly, the system with input
test generation from both Monkey and DroidBot together was
used to accomplish the hybrid input test generation in the third
scenario.
B. App Feature Extraction
Once all the applications are run within the three scenarios,
the logs are collected in text files which are further processed
into a single .csv file for each scenario. The .csv files contains
’0’s and ’1’s symbolizing the presence or absence of each
feature being extracted from the log files.
C. Dataset
We have analysed 2444 Android samples in order to extract
benign and malware apps’ features. Of these, 1222 benign
samples were obtained from McAfee Labs (Intel Security).
Our malware samples consists of 1222 which belong to 49
Android malware families of the Android malware genome
project [26].
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
This section presents the results of the experiments per-
formed to compare the novel hybrid input test generation
method with the random-based and state-based standalone
methods.
A. Experiment 1: Monkey vs. Hybrid
In order to evaluate the efficiency of the hybrid-based test
input generation method, we analysed the extracted features
from the scenario with Monkey alone and the scenario with
hybrid generation. Table I and Table II show the top-10
extracted features from malware and benign dataset respec-
tively using the hybrid test input compared to the use of
Monkey. Both tables show that more features are able to be
extracted from the hybrid-based analysis compared to those
from the Monkey-based analysis using the same application
set. The API method call Ljava/io/File;->exists, for instance,
was logged from 677 malware APKs using the hybrid test
input, while it was only logged from 477 malware APKs using
IEEE International Conference On Cyber Security And Protection Of Digital Services (Cyber Security 2017), June 19-20, 2017, London, UK.
5TABLE I
TOP-10 API CALLS LOGGED FROM MALWARE SAMPLES USING THE
HYBRID METHOD COMPARED TO MONKEY
API signatures Monkey Hybrid Difference
Ljava/io/File;->exists 477 667 190
Ljava/security/MessageDigest;->getInstance 338 473 135
Landroid/content/pm/ApplicationInfo;->getApplicationInfo 435 563 128
Ljava/security/MessageDigest;->digest 310 431 121
Ljava/util/zip/ZipInputStream;->read 219 336 117
Landroid/telephony/TelephonyManager;->getDeviceId 315 429 114
Ljava/util/TimerTask;-><init> 808 921 113
Landroid/content/pm/PackageManager 651 756 105
Lorg/apache/http/client/HttpClient;->execute 89 188 99
Ljava/io/File;->mkdir 274 366 92
TABLE II
TOP-10 API CALLS LOGGED FROM BENIGN SAMPLES USING THE HYBRID
METHOD COMPARED TO MONKEY
API Signatures Monkey Hybrid Difference
Landroid/net/Uri;-¿parse 192 492 300
Ljava/util/zip/ZipInputStream;->read 173 408 235
Ljava/security/MessageDigest;->digest 297 519 222
Ljava/security/MessageDigest;->getInstance 327 549 222
Lorg/apache/http/client/HttpClient;->execute 56 264 208
Ljava/lang/reflect/Method;->getClass 359 565 206
Ljava/lang/Class;->getName 217 422 205
Landroid/content/Context;->getResources 437 639 202
Ljava/util/TimerTask;-><init> 575 774 199
Landroid/content/pm/PackageManager;->checkPermission 164 359 195
the Monkey-based generation. By the same token, the method
Landroid/telephony/TelephonyManager;->getDeviceId in Ta-
ble I, has been extracted from 429 malware APKs using the
hybrid method, whereas only 315 malware APKs logged the
same API method when Monkey was used.
Similar discoveries appear with the benign samples with
even higher differences observed as shown in Table II. With
some of the API calls, the difference between the hybrid
and Monkey test input generation were >200. For example,
the method Landroid/net/Uri;->parse was logged from 492
benign APKs using the hybrid method, while the same method
was extracted from only 192 benign APKs using Monkey.
With dynamic analysis, the malware detection mechanism will
likely perform better with more extracted API call features.
Overall, the hybrid test input generation shows a much higher
efficiency of extracting and logging API calls for the Android
applications during the run-time analysis.
B. Experiment 2: DroidBot vs. Hybrid
Table III and Table IV present the top-10 features extracted
from both malware and benign samples respectively using the
hybrid method vs. DroidBot. With the malware set as in Table
III, it can be seen clearly that the hybrid generation allows
for the discovery of more API calls with a difference of over
100 in some cases. For instance, the class Ljava/util/Date was
extracted from only 177 malware samples using DroidBot,
while with the hybrid method, it was logged from 124 more
malware samples. The differences decreased to less than 20
samples when we applied the same analysis to the benign
sample set. Which indicates that DroidBot is far intelligent
than Monkey but still is not as efficient as the hybrid method.
C. Experiment 3: Monkey vs. DroidBot
In this subsection, we compare the results from Monkey
based analysis to the DroidBot based analysis. In this ex-
TABLE III
TOP-10 API CALLS LOGGED FROM MALWARE SAMPLES USING THE
HYBRID METHOD COMPARED TO DROIDBOT
API signatures DroidBot Hybrid Difference
Ljava/util/Date 177 301 124
Ljava/util/Date;-><init> 171 289 118
Ljava/util/List 171 289 118
Ljava/util/Timer;->schedule 222 339 117
Ljava/util/GregorianCalendar;->getTime 107 207 100
Ljava/util/zip/ZipInputStream;->read 242 336 94
Ljava/io/File;->exists 602 667 65
Ljava/security/MessageDigest;->digest 366 431 65
Lorg/apache/http/client/HttpClient;->execute 133 188 55
Ljava/security/MessageDigest;->update 288 335 47
TABLE IV
TOP-10 API CALLS LOGGED FROM BENIGN SAMPLES USING THE HYBRID
METHOD COMPARED TO DROIDBOT
API signatures DroidBot Hybrid Difference
Landroid/os/Process;->myPid 87 106 19
Landroid/net/Uri;->parse 480 492 12
Landroid/media/AudioManager;->getStreamVolume 37 47 10
Landroid/content/res/AssetManager;->open 320 328 8
Landroid/net/NetworkInfo;->getExtraInfo 23 30 7
Ljava/lang/reflect/Method;->getClass 559 565 6
Landroid/telephony/TelephonyManager;->getSimOperator 72 77 5
Ljava/lang/reflect/Method;->getMethod 245 249 4
Ljava/util/GregorianCalendar;->getTime 188 191 3
Landroid/content/Context;->getAssets 243 246 3
periment, we discovered that some API calls were logged at
a higher number with Monkey whereas others were logged
at a higher number with DroidBot, using the same sample
set. Fig. 6 and Fig. 8 show clearly the differences between
Monkey and DroidBot. Fig. 6 illustrates the differences of the
extracted features from the malware samples where DroidBot
outperforms Monkey. The differences sometimes exceeds 100
for some features extracted from the Malware sample set using
DroidBot vs. Monkey. The differences are even higher with the
benign sample set. Fig. 7 show the top-10 API calls where
DroidBot exceeded Monkey with the benign samples. For
example, Landroid/net/Uri;->parse was extracted from 480
benign APKs using DroidBot compared to only 192 using
Monkey.
In a few exceptional cases, Monkey was better than Droid-
Bot (as shown in Fig. 8) with the malware sample set. More
than 100 malware samples logged Ljava/util/Date;-><init>
using Monkey compare to DroidBot (Fig. 8). This indicates
that Monkey, with its random approach, could sometimes reach
events that DroidBot may be unable to.
Consequently, we can conclude that even though DroidBot
appears to perform better than Monkey in the overall analysis,
since in some cases Monkey logs API calls that DroidBot
could not, both tools can effectively complement each other.
Hence, combining both of them in a hybrid approach makes
sense in order to improve code coverage.
Due to the lack of space, we present comparative results
for methods form the TelephonyManager class which most
malicious apps have been reported to commonly utilize (Fig.
9). The figure shows the overall number of collected API call
logs form the three scenarios using the malware sample set.
From the figure, it can be seen that the hybrid methods enables
more of extraction of the API calls, followed by DroidBot,
then Monkey with the lowest performance.
Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 show graphs of comparative perfor-
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6Fig. 6. Top-10 logged API calls from the malware set where DroidBot was
better than Monkey.
mance of our proposed hybrid method vs. DroidBot and
Monkey for malware and benign samples. Our proposed
method exceeded the other two examined input test generation
methods in most of the logged API signatures. However, we
observed that the overall difference between the hybrid and
DroidBot performance is larger in the malware set compared
to the benign set as can be seen in the graphs.
From the malware sample set 76 API calls showed differ-
ences in numbers between the three methods. The summary of
overall findings from the malware sample set are as follows:
• Out of the 76 API calls with differences, 64 of these
showed the proposed Hybrid method with higher logs
than DroidBot.
• Out of the 76 API calls with differences, 62 showed
the proposed Hybrid method having higher logs than
Monkey.
• Out of the 76 API calls with differences, 49 showed
DroidBot having higher logs than Monkey.
• Out of the 76 API calls with differences, 23 showed
Monkey having higher logs than DroidBot.
• Out of the 76 API calls with differences, 10 showed
Monkey with higher logs than the proposed Hybrid
method.
• Out of the 76 API calls with differences, 4 have DroidBot
showing higher logs than the proposed Hybrid method.
From the above summary we can conclude that the hy-
brid test input generation method surpassed Monkey and the
DroidBot methods in overall extraction of API calls from both
malware and benign Android applications.
Fig. 7. Top-10 logged API calls from the benign set where DroidBot was
better than Monkey.
Fig. 8. Top-10 logged API calls from the malware set where Monkey was
better than better than DroidBot.
V. RELATED WORK
Dynamic analysis has been growing in popularity in the field
of Android malware detection. Several efforts have been made
towards improving the effectiveness of applying Dynamic
analysis to detect Android malware. Dynamic analysis uses
predefined scripts that will be executed while the application
is running in an emulator or real device in order to collect
several behaviour indicators. Code coverage is an important
factor in dynamic analysis because it determines how much
of the malicious behaviour can be discovered. Hence, input
generation needs to be as efficient as possible. Contrary to
previous work on input test generation approaches or dynamic
analysis of Android apps, we attempt to improve the code
coverage efficiency by combining a random method using
Monkey with state-based method using DroidBot and evaluate
the method using real phones. Sophisticated Android mal-
ware employ techniques such as reflection, code obfuscation,
dynamic loading, and native code which may hinder static
analysis tools [29], [30]. Thus, to overcome limitations of
static analysis researchers tend to utilize dynamic analysis
to investigate the apps during execution. The most popular
input test generation tool used in most dynamic analysis
systems is Monkey. Monkey [19] is a command-line tool
which developers can configure to run on an emulator or
real device in order to generate pseudo-random streams of
user events such as touches, gestures, or clicks. It is popular
due to the simplicity of its configuration and use and is also
readily available as part of the Android developers’ toolkit.
However, the random testing approach may not be so effective
in triggering Android malware behaviours. Dynodroid [18] is
Fig. 9. The overall comparisons of number of the logged methods from
TelephonyManager API class using malware sample test.
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Fig. 11. DroidBot vs. Monkey vs. Hybrid: Number of APKs where logs of the given API calls were found in the benign set.
a random exploration tool that generates both UI inputs and
system inputs to Android applications which is based on the
principle of observe-select-execute. It also allows combining
inputs from machine and human. However, it requires instru-
mentation of the Android framework in order to generate the
system events. It can also run only on an emulator, whereas
malware applications can implement anti-emulation techniques
in order to avoid detection. Dynodroid restricts the apps from
communicating with other apps which may affect the analysis
of the malicious apps. A3E [17] is publicly available tool that
consists of two strategies to trigger the applications: the DFS
(depth first search) and a taint-targeted approach. However, the
open source A3E repository does not provide the taint-targeted
strategy. ACTEve [21] is developed to support both system
events and UI events which is based on concolic-testing and
symbolic execution. However, ACTEve needs to instrument
both the Android framework and the application in order to
perform the test. An empirical study that evaluates several test
input generation tools was done by [20]. It comparatively
evaluates Monkey [19], Dynodroid [18], ACTEve [21],
A3E [17], GUIRipper [22], SwiftHand [23], and PUMA
[24], in terms of the code coverage. The study reveals that
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considering the four measurement metrics used in the study.
However, this test was conducted on emulators unlike our work
which was performed on real devices. Moreover, this study did
not include DroidBot which we used in our study. DroidBot
meets our requirements more than other tools because it could
run on devices and does not require instrumentation to the
Android framework. Unlike the previous works, this paper
presents a comparative analysis of a proposed hybrid method
that utilizes a combination of random-based and state-based
input test generation methods. This is to ensure that more
malicious behaviour can be reached and triggered as much
as possible due to potentially higher code coverage.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a novel hybrid test input gen-
eration approach that enables us to trigger more malicious
behaviours of Android malware during dynamic analysis. We
designed and implemented the hybrid strategy to combine a
random-based with a state-based input test generation method
and incorporated this within a framework that enables auto-
mated mass dynamic analysis of applications on real devices.
By doing so we are able to leverage the advantages of the
random mechanism along with those of the state-based tech-
nique to trigger more events and increase the code coverage
and hence the possibility of logging more malicious behaviour
indicated by API function calls. We have performed several
experiments to comparatively evaluate the hybrid strategy
with the random and state-based method on real devices and
the results shows its capability to trigger more malicious
behaviours. The results also showed that several API calls were
extracted more effectively from the hybrid test input generation
than the single based generation. Thus, we conclude that the
use of the hybrid test input generation would improve dynamic
analysis code coverage and potentially impact the detection of
Android malware. For future work, we propose to evaluate the
performance of the hybrid tool using larger sample datasets.
Additionally, we intend to evaluate the impact on detection
systems that can utilize the API calls collected using the hybrid
method for detection of Android malware.
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